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Abstract
In this paper, we gave a preliminary dynamical analysis on the RSA
cryptosystem and obtained a computational formulae of the number
of the fixed points of k order of the RSA. Thus, the problem in [8, 9]
has been solved.
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1 Introduction
Shortly after Diffie and Hellman [1] introduced the idea of public key cryp-
tography, Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA) [2] proposed such a cryp-
tosystem. A simplified version of RSA is the following:
Let n = pq be the product of two large primes of the same size. Let e, d
be two integers satisfying ed ≡ 1( mod ϕ(n)). Call n the RSA modulus,
e the encryption exponent, and d the decryption exponent. Let e and n
be public keys, and let d be the corresponding secret key. A message is
an integer m ∈ Zn. To encrypt m, one computes m
e ≡ c( mod n). To
decrypt the ciphertext c, the receiver computes m ≡ med ≡ cd( mod n).
Denote such a cryptosystem by RSA(n, e). We call m a fixed point of
RSA(n, e) if me ≡ m( mod n). And call m a fixed point of order k if
k is the smallest positive integer such that me
k
≡ m( mod n). Clearly,
f : x −→ xe( mod n) is a dynamical system. Thus, k is exactly the period
of m. For more details on the arithmetic of dynamical systems, see [7].
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In 1979, Blakley and Borosh [3] first pointed out that there were at least
9 fixed points in RSA(n, e). For more references on fixed points, also see
[4]-[6]. Denoted the set of all fixed points of order k of RSA(n, e) by En,e,k
and the cardinality of the set S by |S|. In [8, 9], Yu considered the general
case of fixed points of order k and gave geometric mean value of |Tn,e,k| and
pointed out that it was difficult to give a quantitative description of |Tn,e,k|,
where k is a given positive integer and
Tn,e,k = {x|∀m < k,m ∈ N,x ∈ Z
∗
n, x
ek ≡ x( mod n), xe
m
6= x( mod n)}.
In this essay, we preliminarily consider this question and obtain the
following results:
Theorem 1 |Tn,e,k| =
∑
d|k µ(k/d)(e
d− 1, p− 1)(ed− 1, q− 1) , where µ(·)
is the Mo¨bius function.
Based on this result, we get Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 |En,e,k| =
∑
d|k µ(k/d)((e
d − 1, p− 1)+ 1)((ed− 1, q− 1) + 1).
2 Proof of Main Theorems
We denote the set of positive integers by N . For given positive integers a
and b, we write a|b if a divides b . And denote the greatest common divisor of
a and b by (a, b). Denote a complete set of residues modulo n by Zn, where
1 < n ∈ N , and a reduced set of residues modulo n is denoted by Z∗n. Let
a be an integer relatively prime to n. The order of a modulo n, denoted by
ordn(a), which is the smallest positive integer d such that a
d ≡ 1( mod n).
Lemma 1[8] For 1 < n ∈ N , r ∈ N , let the canonical factorization of
n be
m∏
i=1
paii and Tn,r = {x|x
r ≡ 1( mod n), 1 ≤ x < n}, then |Tn,r| =
m∏
i=1
(r, ϕ(paii )).
Lemma 2 For 1 < n ∈ N , a,m, k ∈ N , e ∈ Z∗
ϕ(n), if a
ek ≡ a( mod n) and
k|m, then ae
m
≡ a( mod n).
Proof Let m = tk. When t = 1, clearly ae
k
≡ ae
m
≡ a( mod n). Suppose
that ae
m
≡ a( mod n) when t = l. And when t = l + 1, we have ae
m
≡
ae
lkek ≡ ae
k
≡ a( mod n). It immediately shows that Lemma 2 is true by
induction.
Lemma 3 For 1 < n ∈ N , a,m, k ∈ N , e ∈ Z∗
ϕ(n), if a
em ≡ a( mod n) and
a ∈ En,e,k, then k|m.
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Proof Let m = kt+ r, t ∈ N , 0 ≤ r < k. We have ae
m
≡ ae
kter ≡ ae
r
≡ a(
mod n) by Lemma 2. Since a ∈ En,e,k, hence r = 0, and Lemma 3 is true.
Proof of Theorem 1 By Lemma 1 and Lemma 3, it is easy to deduce
∑
d|k |Tn,e,d| =
m∏
i=1
(ek−1, ϕ(paii )). By Mo¨bius inversion, it immediately shows
that Theorem 1 is true.
Proof of Theorem 2 By Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, analogously, using
Chinese Remainder Theorem and the method of proof of Theorem 1, it is
easy to deduce that Theorem 2 is true.
Corollary 1 Let 1 < n ∈ N , r ∈ N , and let the canonical factorization of n
be
m∏
i=1
paii . Then |{x|ordn(x) = r, 1 ≤ x ∈ Z
∗
n}| =
∑
d|r(µ(r/d)
m∏
i=1
(d, ϕ(paii ))).
Corollary 2 Let 1 < n ∈ N , r ∈ N , let the canonical factorization of n be
m∏
i=1
paii , and let Fn,r = {x|∀k < r, k ∈ N, 1 ≤ x ≤ n, x
r ≡ x( mod n), xk 6=
x( mod n)}. Then |Fn,r| =
∑
d|r(µ(r/d)
m∏
i=1
(1 + (d− 1, ϕ(paii )))).
3 Conclusion
Clearly, if the factorization of n is known, then computing the number of the
fixed points of order k of the RSA cryptosystem is simple and convenient
by the presented formulae. This is useful to pick the encryption exponent,
which is necessary to ensure the resulting RSA safe from fixed points attack.
Maybe we are not afraid of a fixed point. However, the following problem
should be further considered: Is there a polynomial-time algorithm for find-
ing a fixed point m, wherem 6= 0,±1? This problem and Factoring the RSA
modulus perhaps are equivalent.
Remark: This paper is the revision of paper [10] in the proceedings of
China Crypt’2006, whose Chinese version has been accepted by Journal of
Mathematics (Wuhan, China).
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